



AO 91 (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint (Rev. by USAO on 3/12/20)

☐ Original ☐ Duplicate Original

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Central District of California



United States of America

v.

EVAN BALTIERRA,

Defendant.

Case No. 8:22-mj-00384-DUTY

**CRIMINAL COMPLAINT BY TELEPHONE
OR OTHER RELIABLE ELECTRONIC MEANS**

I, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

On or about the date(s) of July 2020, in the county of Orange in the Central District of California, the defendant(s) violated:

*Code Section**Offense Description*

18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A), (B)

Stalking

This criminal complaint is based on these facts:

Please see attached affidavit.

☒ Continued on the attached sheet.

/s/

Complainant's signature

Steven C. Wrathall, Special Agent, FBI

Printed name and title

Attested to by the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1 by telephone.

Date: May 23, 2022

City and state: Santa Ana, California

Judge's signature

Hon. John D. Early, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Printed name and title

AUSA: Jake Nare (ext. 3549)

AFFIDAVIT

I, Steven C. Wrathall, being duly sworn, declare and state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. I am a Special Agent ("SA") with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and have been so employed since February 2009. I am responsible for investigating violent crimes, including interstate threats, as well as murder for hire, extortion, crimes against children, and kidnappings within the FBI Los Angeles division territory. I also completed 21 weeks of training at the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia, where I received formal training in criminal investigative techniques.

2. During the course of my employment with the FBI, I have employed, or been involved in investigations that employed, various investigative techniques, including search warrants, court-authorized interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications, pen registers/trap and trace, telephone toll analysis, physical surveillance, confidential sources, cooperating witnesses, grand jury proceedings, and fugitive apprehension tools. Through my training, experience, and interaction with other law enforcement officers, I am familiar with the methods employed by those who engage in cyber stalking or make criminal threats over the internet.

II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT

3. This affidavit is made in support of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant against EVAN BALTIERRA

("BALTIERRA") for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A), (B) (Stalking).

4. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon my personal observations, my training and experience, and information obtained from various law enforcement personnel and witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint and arrest warrant and does not purport to set forth all of my knowledge of or investigation into this matter. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all conversations and statements described in this affidavit are related in substance and in part only.

III. SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE

5. Since approximately July 2020, Victim 1 and Victim 1's friends, boyfriend, and boyfriend's family have been the target of a harassment campaign believed to be orchestrated by BALTIERRA. BALTIERRA was an online moderator for Victim 1 – a prominent professional online gamer in the World of Warcraft community who resides in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. In November 2019, Victim 1 travelled to Anaheim, California for "Blizzcon," an annual gaming convention that focuses on several video game franchises, such as World of Warcraft. There, she held a meet and greet with fans at the Anaheim Convention Center Hilton in Anaheim, California. BALTIERRA attended this meet and greet and met Victim 1 in person there for the first time. After this event, Victim 1 noticed a change in BALTIERRA's behavior. BALTIERRA asked to be Victim 1's "valentine" in February of

2020, and Victim 1 told him she had a boyfriend. BALTIERRA then expressed to Victim 1 a desire to travel to Calgary to try and visit her, to which Victim 1 declined.

6. After this event, BALTIERRA's behavior made Victim 1 increasingly uncomfortable, and she decided to remove him as moderator of her stream channel and block him from her social media. BALTIERRA, who resides in the Orange County, California area, has contacted Victim 1 via direct message on various platforms to include Twitter, Instagram, Discord, Twitch, and Reddit. He has also sent emails directly to Victim 1 using a Gmail account. He has contacted Victim 1's boyfriend, J.S., and colleague/friend, G.L., via the same online platforms. Many of these messages contained threats of violence toward Victim 1. BALTIERRA further created fictitious online profiles that displayed photographs of Victim 1, including pornographic photographs where it appears that BALTIERRA photoshopped Victim 1's face onto the photograph. BALTIERRA then sent the photoshopped pictures to VICTIM 1's friends and family and regularly posted the photographed pictures on various internet chat rooms.

IV. RELEVANT DEFINITIONS

7. Based upon my training, experience, and research, I know the following:

a. The Internet is a collection of computers and computer networks which are connected to one another via high-speed data links and telephone lines for the purpose of communicating and sharing data and information. Connections

between Internet computers exist across state and international borders; therefore, information sent between two computers connected to the Internet frequently crosses state and international borders even when the two computers are located in the same state.

b. Individuals and businesses obtain access to the Internet through businesses known as Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"). ISPs provide their customers with access to the Internet using telephone or other telecommunications lines; provide Internet email accounts that allow users to communicate with other Internet users by sending and receiving electronic messages through the ISPs' servers; remotely store electronic files on their customers' behalf; and may provide other services unique to each particular ISP. ISPs maintain records pertaining to the individuals or businesses that have subscriber accounts with them. Those records often include identifying and billing information, account access information in the form of log files, email transaction information, posting information, account application information, and other information both in computer data and written record format.

c. An Internet Protocol address ("IP address") is a unique numeric address used by each computer on the Internet. An IP address is a series of four numbers, each in the range 0-255, separated by periods (e.g., 121.56.97.178). Every computer attached to the Internet must be assigned an IP address so that Internet traffic sent from and directed to that computer may be

properly directed from its source to its destination. Most ISPs control a range of IP addresses.

d. When a customer logs into the Internet using the service of an ISP, the computer used by the customer is assigned an IP address by the ISP. The customer's computer retains that IP address for the duration of that session (i.e., until the user disconnects), and the IP address cannot be assigned to another user during that period.

e. Email, also known as "electronic mail," is a popular means of transmitting messages and/or files in an electronic environment between computer users. When an individual computer user sends an email, it is initiated at the user's computer, transmitted to the subscriber's email server, and then transmitted to its final destination. A server is a computer that is attached to a dedicated network and serves many users. An email server may allow users to post and read messages and to communicate via electronic means.

f. Every email comes with a header which is one part of an email structure. It has basic information such as from whom the email comes, to whom it is addressed, the date/time it was sent, and the subject of the email. This basic information comes in all "basic headers" that most email programs will automatically show. However, there is other detailed technical information that an email has. This detailed technical information can be viewed in a "full header." A full header will have information such as the mail server's name that the email passed through on its way to the recipient, the sender's

IP address, and even the name of the email program and the version used. This information cannot be found in a brief header. A full header is crucial for cases involving email abuse, worm-infected email, harassment and forgeries.

g. A website consists of textual pages of information and associated graphic images. The textual information is stored in a specific format known as Hyper-Text Mark-Up Language and is transmitted from the web servers to various web clients via Hyper-Text Transport Protocol.

V. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

A. Information Provided by Victim 1

8. Based on my discussions with Victim 1, my review of multiple e-mails from Victim 1 detailing the harassment, and my review of other relevant documents, I know the following:

a. Victim 1 was a prominent female gamer and online "streamer" in the World of Warcraft ("WoW") online community. Her online handle was "Nalipls," which she used on multiple platforms of social media. WoW is a video game that was released by Blizzard Entertainment in 2004 and attracts millions of online players. Victim 1 made money by playing video games online and live streaming this content. Victim 1 became so prominent in the WoW community that playing video games became her sole source of income.

b. In approximately November 2019, Victim 1 travelled from Calgary, Alberta, Canada to Anaheim, California, to attend "Blizzcon." "Blizzcon" is a large convention put on annually by Blizzard Entertainment, which is headquartered in

Irvine, California. In 2019, it was estimated that approximately 40,000 people attended the event. During the event, Victim 1 hosted a "meet and greet" at the Anaheim Convention Center Hilton. One of Victim 1's online streamers and chat room moderators, Evan BALTIERRA, attended this event to meet her in person for the first time. At the time of the event, Victim 1 only knew BALTIERRA as "Evanb49" or "Propáin" based on his online gaming handles and social media profile names.¹

c. After meeting BALTIERRA in person, Victim 1 noticed that he began donating large sums of money to her stream and would continue to post messages in her group chat until she recognized his presence. In approximately February 2020, BALTIERRA asked Victim 1 through social media if she would be his "valentine." Victim 1 politely declined and said she had a boyfriend. Following this, BALTIERRA continued to make comments in online group chats about going to see Victim 1 in Calgary.

d. On or about June 29, 2020, Victim 1 received a message from an online friend who told her that BALTIERRA was trying to find out where Victim 1 lived because he wanted to go visit her. Victim 1 told BALTIERRA via a Discord chat messages

¹ During my investigation, I located a current Instagram account with the vanity name of "evanb49." The account contains a profile photograph that, based on BALTIERRA's California DMV photograph, appears to be of BALTIERRA.

that she had a boyfriend, she was uncomfortable with him, and she did not want to meet up with anyone outside of a convention.²

e. Due to BALTIERRA continuing to make her uncomfortable, in approximately July 2020, Victim 1 removed BALTIERRA as a chat moderator, banned him from her live video stream, and blocked him from contacting her. As soon as this occurred, Victim 1 began receiving targeted harassment across a variety of online platforms in the form of messages, including veiled threats, photoshopped pornographic images with her face on them, attempts to obtain her address, and unsolicited mail packages.

f. From approximately July 2020 until present day, Victim 1 estimated that she has been harassed by more than one hundred different Twitter accounts and approximately ten to twenty different Gmail accounts. Victim 1 believes all of them to be used by BALTIERRA. According to Victim 1, the harassment only started once she banned and blocked BALTIERRA from her online gaming community after he made her uncomfortable.

B. Victim 1 Obtains a Temporary Restraining Order Against BALTIERRA

9. On or about February 5, 2021, Victim 1 obtained a Temporary Restraining Order against BALTIERRA in Orange County Superior Court (Case number 30-2021-01182973-CU-HR-CJC), pending a hearing for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order.

² Discord is a Voice over Internet Protocol, instant messaging and digital distribution platform. Discord users communicate with voice calls, video calls, text messaging, media and files in private chats or as part of communities called "servers."

10. On or about March 3, 2021, BALTIERRA was served a copy of the restraining order at his residence located at 20762 Shadow Rock Lane, Trabuco Canyon, California 92679 ("20762 Shadow Rock").

11. On or about April 30, 2021, Victim 1 and BALTIERRA reached and signed a civil agreement in lieu of Victim 1 proceeding with the civil harassment restraining order. The agreement stated the following (among other things):

a. BALTIERRA would pay Victim 1 the sum of \$2,000 through BALTIERRA's attorney.

b. BALTIERRA understood that he was subject to the laws of California, the United States, and Canada. By signing, he acknowledged that should he act in any unlawful conduct, including, but not limited to, criminal threats or criminal harassment against Victim 1, that he would be subject to arrest and criminal prosecution.

c. BALTIERRA was prohibited from contacting Victim 1 directly, or indirectly, in any form, whether by phone or by written, digital, or online means.

d. BALTIERRA agreed to never contact any persons reasonably believed to be a member of Victim 1's online community.

e. BALTIERRA agreed to never make any disparaging comments about Victim 1 online, in any form, which included all social media, streaming channels, and online chat programs.

f. BALTIERRA agreed to never create or share any images which appeared in any way to depict Victim 1 in the nude,

nor any pictures which appeared in any way to depict Victim 1 in a sexual context.

g. BALTIERRA agreed to never create any screen names or online accounts to disguise his identity so that he could interact with Victim 1 or those who followed or participated in Victim 1's online streaming channels and social media accounts.

12. As part of the settlement, Victim 1 provided certain identifiable information for court documents and to BALTIERRA's attorney. Specifically, Victim 1 provided the email address cosplaynali@gmail.com and a P.O. Box (P.O. Box 35066 Sarcee, Calgary, AB T3E7C7) that she previously used, but had not used since 2017 because the building where the P.O. Box was located burned down. According to Victim 1, she provided this address because she was afraid of BALTIERRA discovering her real address.

13. On or about May 23, 2021, Victim 1 started receiving voluminous amounts of spam email to her email address cosplaynail@gmail.com, to include signups to multiple pornographic sites, an email confirmation of an "OnlyFans"³ account that was created with her photographs, and responses to a Craigslist advertisement for sex in which her photoshopped nude photographs were posted. This was the first time this had happened to her, and it occurred less than a month after BALTIERRA learned of this email address.

³ OnlyFans is an internet content subscription service that allows content creators to earn money from user who subscribe to their content. OnlyFans is popular with sex workers and is commonly associated with pornography.

14. On or about June 10, 2021, Victim 1 received a direct message from one of her online community members, "@gamemaster6969." "@gamemaster6969" indicated that the Twitter handle "@animecrusherr" had sent him/her a direct message asking if they wanted personal information about Victim 1. When "gamemaster6969" inquired further, "@animecrusherr" sent Victim 1's full name, P.O. Box address, and email address. This was the first time that her fully identifiable information had appeared on Twitter, less than two months after BALTIERRA learned of her last name and alleged mailing address. Subsequently, on or about December 18, 2021, the Twitter account "@f150oo" posted Victim 1's full name and P.O. Box address publicly on Twitter.

a. In and around January of 2022, G.L., a colleague and friend of Victim 1 who was also active in the WoW community, discovered photoshopped nude images of Victim 1 on a website titled www.cumonprintedpics.com and reached out to the website's administrator. The Twitter handle "@cumtributelayla," responded and told G.L. that he/she would only communicate with VICTIM 1 since the images depicted her. After Victim 1 verified who she was with the website, on or about February 18, 2022, "@cumtributelayla" sent VICTIM 1 a direct message on Twitter that provided some metadata associated with Victim 1's photographs posted on the website. "@cumtributelayla" provided Victim 1 with an email of baltierra5@yahoo.com. Victim 1 knew baltierra5@yahoo.com belonged to BALTIERRA because that was the email address she knew to be associated with his PayPal account.

b. As BALTIERRA's harassment continued, his messages to her evolved into threats. On or about March 5, 2022, VICTIM 1 received a direct message from Twitter account @maxxieRu that read as follows: "This is addressed as a general message to everyone that Nalipls (Victim 1) . . . have interacted with or know. You all want to try and ignore things but a day will come where Nali wishes she would have done something. She will be directly responsible for friends, family and other close ones to get affected in a very bad way. They wanted to involve friends and family? Well others can play that game as well. You all want to make a joke out of things and act like the situation won't end badly for Nali. You know who the most dangerous people are in the world? The ones who don't care what they lose to achieve their goal. Nali will come to an end and after years of planning / waiting for the right opportunity you will all say "damn something actually did happen" and maybe you shouldn't have been so sassy. Might want to pass this on to Nali and Borngood. I'm sure you can reach them somehow because it won't be just them affected anymore." I know from my investigation and conversation with Victim 1 that "Borngood" is Victim 1's boyfriend, J.S.'s, online screen name.

c. On the same date, on or about March 5, 2022, Victim 1 received threatening messages from a Twitter user using the account name "@naliplswhore" that read "don't worry he won't have Nali around forever," "time is counting down for you," and "Nalipls is not going to be around forever :)"

d. On or about March 7, 2022, Victim 1 received a direct message from the Twitter user @naliplswhore that read, "Hired people to I'll come and you get bitch."

e. On or about March 13, 2022, Victim 1 received an email from warzo566@gmail.com at her cosplaynali@gmail.com account that read, "Think about who's still out here and freely roam around. One day things are going to come crashing down for Nali and everything that she loves. Think that it will just drop that easily? Might want to check some mail soon as well. [Victim 1] will be hunted down no matter how long it takes. And everytime that slut shows up online her naked pictures and info gets spread even more and everyone she interacts with gets messed with also." Two other email addresses were listed in the "to" line of the email, pvpzix@gmail.com (another account of Victim 1 associated with her PayPal) and jsap006@gmail.com (J.S.'s email address).

f. On or about March 15, 2022, two days after the email about receiving mail, Victim 1 received a call from her local post office and was told that someone had sent her a package, but it contained an incorrect shipping address with her name. Victim 1 was told that the shipping address listed on the package was the old P.O. Box that Victim 1 had only used for the court documents in the Civil Harassment Restraining Order filed against BALTIERRA. Victim 1 alerted the Calgary Police, who inspected the package and determined that the content of the package was a box of "KY Me & You" condoms that had been sent through Amazon.

**C. Conversations and Information Received from Constable
Corinne Murray, Calgary Police**

15. Based on my discussions with Constable ("Cst.") Corinne Murray, Calgary Police, my review of multiple e-mails from Cst. Murray detailing the harassment, and my review of other relevant documents, I know the following:

a. Calgary Police has been investigating the harassment of Victim 1 since approximately 2020 and has filed charges on 19 counts of various criminal charges in Canada with warrants being issued for BALTIERRA. The nature of these charges is "criminal stalking" and "non-consensual distribution of intimate images and videos," among others.

b. On or about June 7, 2021, an individual, believed to be BALTIERRA, made a telephone call to the Calgary Police Department's non-emergency line of (403) 266-1234. The caller referred to himself as "Austin" and requested that Calgary Police conduct a welfare check on Victim 1. "Austin" said that there were some disturbing posts on Victim 1's Facebook account and he was concerned for her safety. During the call, "Austin" tried to get dispatch to give him the address of Victim 1 and also requested that the responding officer give him a call. During the call, "Austin" referred to himself as a "former police officer."⁴ Calgary Police refused to give "Austin" the

⁴ I know from my investigation that BALTIERRA was employed briefly as a police officer with Los Angeles World Airport Police, but did not complete his probationary period and resigned.

address and when they contacted Victim 1, they learned that she was fine and had not posted anything on her Facebook account.

c. Cst. Murray requested toll records and account information for the suspicious telephone call that originated from (949) 750-0109. On or about June 13, 2021, pursuant to a subpoena, AT&T provided tolls and subscriber information for (949) 750-0109. The telephone account listed the registered user as BALTIERRA and the billing address as his residence located at 20762 Shadow Rock Lane.

d. Cst. Murray reviewed BALTIERRA's toll information for (949) 750-0109, which showed BALTIERRA contacted the Calgary based telephone number (403) 813-8645 on or about June 7 and June 8, 2021. Further investigation revealed that telephone number (403) 813-8645 belonged to a private investigator in the Calgary area. Cst. Murray contacted the private investigator via the phone number (403) 813-8645 and was told by the private investigator that BALTIERRA attempted to hire the investigator to find out Victim 1's home address. The investigator declined the job and told BALTIERRA that he would need an attorney to request the information.

D. Information Received from Blizzard Entertainment

16. On or about February 24, 2022, I received information from Blizzard Entertainment. Based on the information I reviewed, I know the following:

a. On or about August 5, 2020, Victim 1 contacted Blizzard about an issue of ongoing harassment from another player. After researching the issue, Blizzard determined that

the harassment came from the account using "Battle.net ID 51087712," which was associated to BALTIERRA, and suspended the player's WoW account.

b. On or about August 8, 2020, Victim 1 contacted Blizzard and reported harassment from the player's alternate account. Blizzard was able to verify the issue and applied a 72-hour suspension to the alternate account (Battle.net ID 395473442) and a 216-hour suspension to the main account. Blizzard determined that the account was used by BALTIERRA through player registration and IP information.

c. On or about September 10, 2020, Blizzard received a harassment report through Twitter regarding the same accounts. Both accounts were being accessed by the same IP address and the reported player admitted to using an alternate character to bypass the "ignore" setting. Both accounts also shared similar contact information. Blizzard suspended both WoW accounts for 48 days and issued a final warning.

d. On or about December 13, 2020, Victim 1 contacted Blizzard about the continuing harassment by both of BALTIERRA's accounts. Blizzard permanently closed both WoW accounts. The nature of the ongoing harassment was continued spamming of direct messages to Victim 1 and repeated invitations to her to join groups. According to the complaint, the frequency of the messages was so high that it made it impossible for Victim 1 to play the game, which affected her ability to make money through playing WoW, which was her main source of income at the time.

e. On or about December 30, 2020, BALTIERRA contacted Blizzard to appeal the permanent bans on both accounts, but the actions were upheld.

f. The contact information for the banned player provided by Blizzard was "Evan BALTIERRA" at 20762 Shadow Rock Lane.

E. Conversations and Information Received from G.L.

17. Based on my discussions with G.L., my review of multiple e-mails from G.L. detailing the harassment, and my review of other relevant documents, I know the following:

a. G.L. and Victim 1 know each other from the online WoW community and have known each other since approximately 2016. G.L. and Victim 1 first met at the 2018 "Blizzcon" in Anaheim, California. G.L. is currently contracted with Blizzard as an "Esports Content Creator" and also acts in a sideline reporter and host capacity for Blizzard.

b. BALTIERRA has sent G.L. direct messages on social media platforms since approximately January 2021 and harassed her over email since approximately November 2021. G.L. has also received the photoshopped nude photographs of Victim 1 in her direct messages and on her Twitter feed as replies from various Twitter handles, all believed to be BALTIERRA. G.L. believes BALTIERRA is targeting her because she is Victim 1's friend and has spoken up on Twitter about BALTIERRA and how he has been stalking Victim 1.

c. G.L. filed a police report with the Columbus Police Department in Columbus, Ohio, about the harassment and threats coming from BALTIERRA.

d. On or about January 25, 2022, G.L. received an email from snapcrackk@gmail.com that read, "People see everything G.L. and you guys keep pushing it and pushing it. Wasn't going to message again but have to confront this. Look at your messages that's attached to this email, do you really think that no one cares? And then you laugh about it. Then you proceed to say 'he's not a threat or dangerous' do you truly believe that? With someone that has combat deployments and other training.⁵ Then you like a post that you had to actually dig for because it's hidden by twitter behind show more replies then 'show content that may be offensive' These are the type of things that's going to cause people to get hurt because no one thinks something is actually going to happen and it's just going to remain 'online.' It's not just you either, it's also [Victim 1] and others that are going to cause something major to happen. There's already a plan to dela with [Victim 1]. You might want to bring this up with her. We already had our discussion and you didn't want to talk anymore but if you feel like reaching out to try and calm the situation down a bit or explain things. You know where to reach me."

⁵ I know from my investigation that BALTIERRA was formerly a Marine with at least one combat deployment, before he became a police officer.

e. G.L. explained that the threats that BALTIERRA makes are toward the WoW community as a whole, while blaming Victim 1, and she is concerned that BALTIERRA will commit some act of mass violence at a WoW gathering or event.

F. Information Received from J.S.

18. Based on my discussions with Victim 1 about J.S. and his mother, my review of multiple e-mails from Victim 1 detailing the harassment of J.S. and his mother, and my review of other relevant documents, I know the following:

a. J.S. is Victim 1's boyfriend. Victim 1 began dating J.S. before the harassment and stalking began. J.S. believes that BALTIERRA has targeted J.S. simply because he is dating Victim 1.

b. From the time period of on or about March 7, 2022 to March 9, 2022, J.S. received multiple text messages of photoshopped nude photographs with Victim 1's head on them from telephone number (714) 406-4893.

c. On or about March 11, 2022, I used publicly available databases to determine that telephone number (714) 406-4893 was an active voice over internet protocol (VOIP) number operated by Bandwidth.com. I know from my training and experience that people will sometimes use VOIP numbers to mask their true identity and true telephone numbers.

d. On or about March 9, 2022, J.S. received an email from lambbee7@gmail.com, an account previously used to harass Victim 1, that read, "Amazing what money can do when you have a lot of it and can freely spend it how you want without breaking

the bank. People will be hired and if it's not from who you expect then those people will do the job of taking care of Victim 1 and her inner circle. Or sometimes if you want things done right you have to do it yourself. Victim 1 will never truly be free of her situation and all her friends are just as big of a target."

e. On or about March 10, 2022, J.S. received another email from lambbee7@gmail.com that read, "Very much enjoy how an online community thinks that they have any power to actually stop something from happening face to face. They want to support [Victim 1] and try to defend her but they spit the hate right back lol. This will all be over once that stupid slut is gone and she will be there's no doubt about that. She's such a big target." Attached to the email were two photoshopped nude images with Victim 1's head on them.

f. On or about March 10, 2022, J.S.'s mother received an email from lambbee7@gmail.com containing the same two photoshopped nude images with Victim 1's head on them that were sent to J.S.

G. Victim Impact

19. I have spoken with Victim 1 on multiple occasions regarding the events discussed above. During those conversations, Victim 1 told me that she felt unsafe as a result of BALTIERRA's actions. Victim 1 stated that she was feeling a great deal of anxiety about the extent of BALTIERRA's knowledge and exploitation of her personal life and she was fearful of what further actions BALTIERRA might take against her.

Furthermore, because of BALTIERRA's actions, Victim 1 has removed herself as much as possible from online activities, which was her primary source of income, and BALTIERRA's actions have therefore caused a financial strain on her.

20. When speaking with G.L., she stated that she feels unsafe and is worried about the escalation that BALTIERRA has shown in his messages and emails. G.L. stated that Blizzard hired an extra security person for her at Blizzard events and BALTIERRA's photograph was posted at the event as someone who is a threat. These measures have been taken as a direct result of BALTIERRA's behavior and actions toward G.L.

H. Search Warrant Executed at BALTIERRA'S Residence

21. On or about March 22, 2022, the Honorable Autumn D. Spaeth, U.S. Magistrate Judge, issued search warrants for BALTIERRA's person and his residence located at 20762 Shadow Rock Lane. The FBI executed the search warrants on that same date and seized multiple digital devices pursuant to the warrant, including, but not limited to, BALTIERRA's iPhone, desktop computer, and multiple thumb drives. A 9mm handgun was also seized. During the execution of the warrant, BALTIERRA was interviewed by Special Agents Steven Wrathall and Tyler Call. During the interview, BALTIERRA admitted to harassing Victim 1 online, to include, among other things, paying someone to create photoshopped nude images of her and then sending these photographs out to friends and family and sending threatening messages to Victim 1.

22. On or about March 23, 2022 through May 23, 2022, I reviewed the digital devices seized during the search warrant and learned the following:

a. On one of the thumb drives seized from BALTIERRA's residence, I located many photoshopped nude images with Victim 1's face on it.

b. I performed a Cellebrite extraction on BALTIERRA's iPhone and located the following:

i. Evidence of the following accounts being present on the device: evanb49@yahoo.com, baltierra5@yahoo.com, lambee7@gmail.com, snapcrackk@gmail.com, warzo566@gmail.com, @nalip1swhore, and @maxxieru;

ii. Many photoshopped nude images with Victim 1's face on them;

iii. Non pornographic images of Victim 1 and G.L.;

iv. A WhatsApp conversation between BALTIERRA and another user in which BALTIERRA paid to have the photoshopped nude images of Victim 1 created and supplied the photographs of Victim 1;

v. Internet search history that included the following searched terms: "cumonprintedpics," "nalip1s nude reddit," "how many stamps do I need for a letter to Canada," "fake Instagram accounts," "order something in Calgary Canada to get sent to po box," "can you mail an envelope without a return address," "how long before Instagram removes a catfish," "how to hide number," "how to address a envelope to Canada," "nalip1s

cosplay," "cumonprintedpics nalipls," "mailing someone naked photos," "will a civil case show up on a background check if it was settled outside of court", "crossing border to Canada with someone in trunk," "nalipls nude cum," "can a warrant stop you from getting a passport," "shooting range near me," and "death during sex porn."

VI. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON ONLINE HARASSMENT

23. Based on my training and experience and my consultation with other agents, I know that online personalities and their families are at high risk of being targeted by disgruntled fans and other online personas. As a result, I know that online personalities do not generally make their private information publicly available and that they take targeted measures to keep that information private. For instance, online personalities typically use screen names and avoid using their real names or contact information in order to make themselves less susceptible to becoming targets of stalking or harassment schemes.

///

///

///

VII. CONCLUSION

24. For all the reasons described above, there is probable cause to believe that BALTIERRA has committed a violation 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A), (B): Stalking.

Attested to by the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1 by telephone on this 23rd day of May, 2022.



HONORABLE JOHN D. EARLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE